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Local Gun Bans in California:
A Futile Exercise
By DON B. KATES & C.D. MICHEL*
Within the limits of the City and County of San Francisco, the sale,
distribution, transfer and manufacture of all firearms and ammuni-
tion shall be prohibited .. . [and] no resident of the City and
County of San Francisco shall possess any handgun unless required
for professional purposes.
Proposition H (held invalid, 2006)1
THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THE AUTHORITY of California local
governments to "license" firearms possession-i.e., the authority to
permit or deny the possession of firearms and/or ammunition within
a locality's geographical limits. 2 Particular attention will be focused on
two cases that invalidated attempts by the City and County of San
Francisco ("San Francisco") to ban firearms. 3 The inevitable conclu-
sion from these and other cases construing the relevant statutes is that
local governments may not ban handguns and other firearms that
state law does not forbid the law-abiding adult citizenry from
possessing.
Part I will briefly examine the limited constitutional issues that
inform the debate, at least in California. Part II examines the state
statutes governing local firearms regulations, noting that implicit in
* The authors are among the counsel for plaintiffs in Fiscal v. City & County of San
Francisco (San Francisco Superior Court case no. CPF-05-505960), the case in which the
Proposition H handgun ban was held invalid by the San Francisco Superior Court. That
decision is currently pending on appeal.
1. The foregoing is the substance of the second section of Proposition H. The third
section also prohibited and confiscated all handguns by ordinary residents of the city. See
infra Appendix A.
2. See Galvan v. Superior Court, 452 P.2d 930, 933 (Cal. 1969) (construing a munici-
pal firearms ordinance in light of a state law using the word "license" which the Supreme
Court defined as meaning "permission or authority to do a particular thing or exercise a
particular privilege").
3. See Doe v. City & County of San Francisco, 186 Cal. Rptr. 380 (Ct. App. 1982);
Statement of Decision, Fiscal v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 05-3674 (Cal. Super.
Ct. June 12, 2006) (on file with authors).
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that framework is the California Legislature's repeated recognition
that civilian firearms ownership is part of the solution to violent crime.
Part III examines the seminal California case on local gun bans, Doe v.
City & County of San Francisco,4 and subsequent firearms jurisprudence
leading up to the recent decision invalidating San Francisco's Proposi-
tion H.5 Part IV examines the state Unsafe Handgun Act 6 and its im-
pact on local attempts to ban handguns in California.
It may be useful to begin with a brief overview of recent local
firearms ordinances, including Proposition H. Proposition H, which
San Francisco adopted by public referendum in November 2005,
banned and confiscated all handguns and forbade the sale of any kind
of firearm and all firearm ammunition.7 This was the most extreme
gun ban ever enacted in the United States, except for the confiscation
of all firearms enacted by the seceding state of Tennessee during the
Civil War.8 By way of comparison, the District of Columbia has banned
handgun possession, excepting only handguns registered by the cur-
rent owner in that city before 1976.9 But no American jurisdiction
goes so far as banning the sale of rifles and shotguns, nor making
currently-owned guns virtually useless by banning the sale of all am-
munition, like Proposition H. In a decision rendered shortly after Pro-
position H became effective, the San Francisco Superior Court
invalidated it as contrary to, and preempted by, state law. 10
Proposition H was the latest in a series of sweeping gun laws en-
acted by the City and County of San Francisco. Thirty-seven years ear-
lier, in 1968, San Francisco enacted an ordinance requiring that all
handgun owners register their firearms.11 Despite the state law pre-
cluding firearms licensing, 12 discussed in detail below, the ordinance
was upheld by the California Supreme Court in Galvan v. Superior
4. 186 Cal. Rptr. 380 (Ct. App. 1982).
5. Proposition H, enacted in 2005, would have banned and confiscated all handguns
owned by ordinary civilians and forbidden the sale of long guns and firearms ammunition.
See Appendix A.
6. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12125-12233 (West 2000).
7. See infta Appendix A.
8. See Robert Moon, A Brief Historical Note on Gun Control in Tennessee, 82 CASE &
COMMENT 38, 38 (1977). One reason for Tennessee disarming its population was presuma-
bly because enraged opponents of secession were very numerous, even a majority in many
counties. Another reason may have been to gather arms with which to equip the state's
own forces.
9. D.C. CODE §§ 7-2502.01, 7-2502.02(a) (4) (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2006).
10. Statement of Decision, Fiscal v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 05-3674 (Cal.
Super. Ct. June 12, 2006) (on file with authors).
11. See Doe v. City & County of San Francisco, 186 Cal. Rptr. 380, 382 (Ct. App. 1982).
12. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12026 (West 2000).
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Court.'3 The court reasoned that Penal Code section 12026 barred lo-
calities from "licensing"-i.e., exercising authority to permit or ban
guns. 1 4 In contrast, registration requires only enumeration of the guns
people own, with no pretense that the city has authority over whether
guns may be owned or not.'
5
Three years later, in 1972, a San Francisco ordinance that pur-
ported to require a permit to buy a handgun was quickly stricken
down by the Court of Appeal as contrary to two different state laws:
Penal Code section 12026 and a new law, Government Code section
53071,16 which had been enacted to preempt local laws requiring ei-
ther registration or licensing of firearms of any type. 1 7 In Sippel v.
Nelder, the Court of Appeal found, as had the California Supreme
Court in Galvan, that under section 12026, law-abiding, responsible
adult Californians are "entitled" to purchase and possess a handgun,
even without resorting to section 53071's express preemption
language. 18
Section 12026 expressly excludes from those to whom it grants
handgun rights any person who is prohibited from such possession by
state laws, such as Penal Code section 12021.19 But, as the Sippel opin-
ion noted, the plaintiff in the instant case did not fall within the ex-
cepted classes prescribed by Penal Code section 12021, and he was
therefore entitled, under Penal Code section 12026, to possess a con-
cealed firearm at his residence without obtaining a license or permit
of any kind.2 0
It bears emphasis that under the reasoning of the Galvan and Sip-
pel cases, local ordinances banning handguns would have been invalid
even prior to the enactment of Government Code section 9619 (now,
section 53071), since they directly conflict with Penal Code section
12026.
In 1982, San Francisco adopted an ordinance that sought to dis-
tinguish itself from a licensing or registration regulation by banning
13. 452 P.2d 930, 933 (Cal. 1969).
14. Id. at 933.
15. Id. at 933-34.
16. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 53071 (West 1997).
17. Sippel v. Nelder, 101 Cal. Rptr. 89 (Ct. App. 1972).
18. Id. at 90.
19. This statute prohibits any person who has been convicted of a felony, or any per-
son "who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug" from possessing, owning, or purchas-
ing a handgun. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12021(a) (1) (West 2000).
20. Sippe, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
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and confiscating handguns outright.2' Although the ordinance pur-
ported to ban the possession of all handguns, it did not seek to abol-
ish all exceptions. Among those exceptions was the power the state
grants to local police chiefs and sheriffs to issue concealed carry li-
censes under Penal Code section 12050.22
This ordinance was challenged by mandamus actions filed di-
rectly in the Court of Appeal, whose panel unanimously struck down
the ordinance as contrary to section 12026 and preempted by section
53071.23 Though the City sought review, no member of the Rose Bird
Supreme Court voted to hear the matter. Despite later rulings that
distinguish and arguably limit Doe, it remains the most significant pro-
nouncement on the scope of Penal Code section 12026 and Govern-
ment Code section 53071. Doe's scope, and even its validity, was a
central issue in determining the legality of Proposition H.24
In the mid-1990s, multiple cities enacted ordinances banning gun
stores from selling affordable self-defense handguns, which the ordi-
nances defined as "Saturday Night Specials." 25 One of the first cities
that adopted such an ordinance, West Hollywood, was sued in Califor-
nia Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. City of West Hollywood.26 The Second District
Court of Appeal upheld the ordinance, distinguishing it from the one
invalidated in Doe, in that it did not prohibit the general acquisition of
guns, but rather only a certain type of gun, and it was not a "licensing"
or "registration" law. 27
21. See Doe v. City & County of San Francisco, 186 Cal. Rptr. 380, 381 (Ct. App. 1982).
22. See id.; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 12050 (West 2000) (providing that "[t]he sheriff
of a county, upon proof that the person applying is of good moral character, that good
cause exists for the issuance, and that the person applying satisfies any one of [the listed
conditions] and has completed a course of training .... may-issue to that person a license
to carry a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the
person . . ").
23. Doe, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 384, 385.
24. See Statement of Decision, Fiscal v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 05-3674
(Cal. Super. Ct. June 12, 2006) (on file with authors).
25. In 1996, one of the authors of this article, Don Kates, spoke on a panel sponsored
by the JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY. Also on the panel was the leading aca-
demic advocate of gun control, Boalt Hall's Franklin Zimring. As to Saturday Night Spe-
cials, Professor Zimring forthrightly declared: "I have been studying 'Saturday Night
Specials' for twenty-five years and have yet to find one. There is no content to the term
other than [that it is used to describe] a gun that poor people with dark skins can use to
shoot each other .... There is no principled way to define or ban SNS."
26. Cal. Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. City of West Hollywood, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 591 (Ct. App.
1998).
27. Id. at 599.
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I. Constitutional Provisions Protecting Gun Ownership and
Acquisition
A. The Second Amendment
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution enun-
ciates the "right of the people to keep and bear Arms." 28 Gun control
advocates have offered two theories in arguing that the Second
Amendment has no impact on firearms prohibitions: (1) that what the
Second Amendment actually protects is the right of the states to have
armed militias;29 and (2) that the Amendment guarantees only a "col-
lective right," by which is meant a "right" that does not guarantee indi-
viduals anything and cannot be vindicated by litigants suing either on
their own behalf or even on behalf of the collectivity. 30
As William Van Alstyne has noted, these theories originated in
the gun control debates of the twentieth century and were unknown
to the Founding Fathers.3' Neither were these theories known to nine-
teenth-century constitutional analysts, who analyzed the Second
Amendment as a right of people to have guns, analogizing it to the
rights guaranteed under the First Amendment, the right to jury trial,
the right of habeas corpus, and other constitutional rights. 32
In California, the debate is academic. The Ninth Circuit has ac-
cepted the states' right theory of the Second Amendment 3 and found
that the Constitution does not prohibit the state from enacting legisla-
tion aimed at private gun control.3 4 The California Supreme Court
has also come to the same conclusion. 35
28. U.S. CONsT. amend. II.
29. See, e.g., Dennis A. Henigan, Arms, Anarchy and the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L.
REv. 107, 108-10 (1991).
30. Unlike "collective rights," such as the right to assemble and the right not to be
discriminated against in voting on account of race or sex, all of which can be vindicated by
individual litigants, the right to arms applies not to individuals but "to the whole people as
body politic," which supposedly means that it does not guarantee anything to anyone. See,
e.g., John Randolph Prince, The Naked Emperor: The Second Amendment and the Failure of
Originalism, 40 BRANDEIS L. J. 659, 694 (2002).
31. William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DuK,
L.J. 1236, 1243 n.19 (1994) ("If anyone entertained this notion in the period during which
the Constitution and Bill of Rights were debated and ratified, it remains one of the most
closely guarded secrets of the eighteenth century, for no known writing surviving from the
period between 1787 and 1791 states such a thesis.") (quoting Professor Halbrook).
32. See David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L.
REv. 1359 (1998) (consisting of 183 pages detailing every nineteenth-century reference to
the Second Amendment the authors found).
33. See Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2002).
34. Id. at 1087.
35. See Kasler v. Lockyer, 2 P.3d 581, 586 (Cal. 2000).
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B. State Constitutional Protection of a Right to Arms
California is one of a handful of states that lacks an explicit guar-
antee of the right to arms in its constitution. Article I, section 1 of the
state constitution does guarantee the right to self-defense. 36 However,
the California Supreme Court has declared, in dictum, that this con-
stitutional provision does not encompass any right to arms.3 7 This was
dictum because the meaning and scope of the California constitu-
tional right to self-defense was not before the court, it not having been
raised or argued by the parties. Had supporters of the right to bear
arms been afforded an opportunity to brief the issue, the court may
have been informed that eighteenth and nineteenth-century Ameri-
cans followed the view of "[n]atural law philosophers [who] saw self-
defense as the premier natural right. From it they adduced .. . the
right to arms,"38 and that modern philosophers who have considered
the question agree that a right to arms is implicit in the philosophical
right to self-defense. 39 The court also may have realized that a United
States Supreme Court opinion by Justice Holmes intimates that the
Federal Constitution embraces a right to self-defense that includes a
constitutional right to arms. 40
Another advantage of having the issue argued and briefed would
have been that the court might have found some other function it
could have ascribed to the constitutional right to self-defense. This
would have allowed the court to mention that function instead ofjust
saying that the right to self-defense does not encompass a right to
arms without suggesting any other function the right to self-defense
conceivably might have.
36. See CAL. CONsT. art. 1, § I ("All people are by nature free and independent and
have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty . ").
37. Kasler, 2 P.3d at 586.
38. Don B. Kates, The Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection, 9 CONST. COM-
MENT. 87, 102 (1992). Cf Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty and the Right
to Self-Preservation, 39 AIA. L. REv. 103, 118 n.35, 119 (1987) (quoting Hobbes, who believed
"man is forbidden [by God and His natural laws] to do, that, which is destructive of his own
life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he
thinketh that it may be best preserved," and Locke, who deemed the rights of man to
include those things which "tend[ ] to the Preservation of the Life, the Liberty, Health,
Limb or Goods of another").
39. See Michael Huemer, Is There a Right to Own a Gun?, 29 Soc. THEORY & PRAC.
297-324 (2003); Lester Hunt & Todd C. Hughes, The Liberal Basis of the Right to Bear Arms,
14 PUBLIC AFFAIRS Q. 1, 7 (2000); Lance Stell, Gun Control, in A COMPANION TO APPLIED
ETHICS 192-209 (R.G. Frey & C.H. Wellman, eds., Blackwell 2003); see also Samuel C.
Wheeler, Self-Defense Rights and Coerced Risk-Acceptance, 11 PUBLIC AFFAIRS Q. 421, 433-34
(1997); Samuel C. Wheeler, Arms as Insurance, 13 PUB. AFF. Q. 111, 115 (1999).
40. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 143 (1913).
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II. The California Statutory Scheme Regulating Firearms
In lieu of state constitutional protection of civilian firearms own-
ership, California does have several statutory protections in place.
This regulatory scheme clearly reflects the Legislature's determina-
tion that firearms possession by law-abiding responsible adults can de-
ter 4' or thwart crime.42 In addition, state law and public policy rely on
civilian possession of firearms as an important element in game man-
agement.43 This includes even handgun ownership, as handgun hunt-
ing is recognized and regulated in California.44
41. Based on twenty-five years of statistics from all United States counties, economists
John Lott and David Mustard conclude that the widely publicized enactment of state laws
under which millions of concealed handgun carry permits have been issued resulted in a
marked decrease in confrontation crime including murder. See JOHN R. LOTT JR., MORE
GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN CONTROL LAw (1998); John R. Lott &
David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns, 26J. LEGAL STUD.
1 (1997); see also David B. Mustard, CultureAffects OurBeliefs AboutFirearms, butData AreAlso
Important, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1387, 1393 (2003). A number of different scholars who criti-
cized their methodology have redone the study using different, assertedly better, methods
but came to the same results. Some of these studies even concluded that Lott & Mustard
had underestimated the deterrent effect. See, e.g., John R. Lott, Guns, Crime, and Safety:
Introduction, 44J.L. & ECON. 605 (2001); Florenz Plassmann & T. Nicolaus Tideman, Does
the Right to Carry Concealed Handguns Deter Countable Crimes? Only a Count Analysis Can Say, 44
J.L. & ECON. 771 (2001); see also Florenz Plassman &John Whitley, Confirming 'More Guns,
Less Crime,' 55 STAN. L. REV. 1313, 1315 (2003). But scholars who oppose gun ownership
vehemently disagree. See, e.g., Albert W. Altschuler, Two Guns, Four Guns, Six Guns, More:
Does Arming the Public Reduce Crime, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 365 (1997); Ian Ayres & John J.
Donohue, Shooting Down the 'More Guns, Less Crime'Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1193 (2003);
Daniel Black and Daniel Nagin, Do Right-to-Carry Laws Deter Violent Crime, 27J. LEGAL STUD.
209 (1998); Franklin Ziming & Gordon Hawkins, Concealed Handguns: The Counterfeit Deter-
rent, 7 RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 46, 55-57 (1997).
42. The latest analysis of various studies concludes that there is "a great deal of self-
defensive use of firearms" in the United States. "[I]n fact, [there are] more defensive gun
uses [by victims] than crimes committed with firearms." JAMES B. JACOBS, CAN GUN CON-
TROL WoRK ? 14 (2002) (emphasis added).
43. See, e.g., FISH & GAME CODE § 325 (West 1998) (authorizing special hunting sea-
sons where "game mammals.., have increased in numbers in any areas, districts, or por-
tions thereof ... to such an extent that the mammals or birds are damaging public or
private property, or are overgrazing their range"); FISH & GAME CODE §§ 1801(e)-(g)
(West 1998) (declaring the contribution of hunting and its importance in achieving state
environmental and game management policy); FISH & GAME CODE § 4180 (West 1998)
(authorizing unlicensed out-of-season hunting of pestiferous or destructive animals); FISH
& GAME CODE § 4188 (West 1998 & Supp. 2007) (requiring the Department to inform
landowners having special permits to rid their lands of dangerous or pestiferous animals
that they may open the lands to hunters out of season). In addition, the Department's
duties include the proclamation of general hunting seasons of such duration as it deter-
mines will suffice to prevent over-population of animal species leading to destruction of
the environment and the animals's death by starvation. See, e.g., Wildlife Alive v. Chicker-
ing, 553 P.2d 537, 545 (Cal. 1976).
44. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 311(1), 353(c), (d) (2006).
Winter 2007] LOCAL GUN BANS IN SAN FRANCISCO
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
A. The Uniform Firearms Act
In analyzing California's 1923 Uniform Firearms Act 45 ("UFA"),
one must bear in mind the California Supreme Court's admonition
that, to understand a statute, one must "'take into account matters
such as context, the object in view, the evils to be remedied, the his-
tory of the times and of legislation upon the same subject .... " 46 To
the same effect, the court has invoked Justice Holmes' assertion that
"a page of history is worth a volume of logic .. .
For the UFA, the relevant period of history is the first quarter of
the twentieth century during which complete handgun bans and
handgun permit laws were being enacted across the United States and
the world.48 These anti-gun laws reflected the tumultuous events of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in which assassins
had taken or menaced the lives of the Russian Czar, the Empress of
Austria, an Austrian Archduke (leading to the First World War), and
many other luminaries including President McKinley, former Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Attorney
General A. Mitchell Palmer, Henry Frick, J.P. Morgan,John D. Rocke-
feller, and the mayors of Chicago and New York.
Motivated by fears of political turmoil and labor unrest, gun per-
mit laws appeared in England, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and
throughout Europe, while Germany and a few other nations banned
civilian ownership of any kind of firearm. 49
The first such twentieth-century American law was South Caro-
lina's 1902 complete ban on handgun sales,50 a policy the American
45. The California version of the UFA is Laws of 1923 ch. 339. The UFA was also
called the Uniform Revolver Act. Both names are misnomers. The UFA is not a "Uniform
Firearms Act" because it applied only to handguns not to rifles or shotguns. Neither was it a
"Uniform Revolver Act" because it applied to all handguns, not just revolvers.
46. Harry Carian Sales v. Agric. Labor Relations Bd., 703 P.2d 27, 36 (Cal. 1985) (cita-
tion omitted).
47. Santa Clara Local Transp. Auth. v. Guardino, 902 P.2d 225, 234 (Cal. 1995).
48. RESTRICTING HANDGUNS: THE LIBERAL SKEPTICS SPEAK OUT 14B20, 29B30 (Don B.
Kates ed., 1979); LEE KENNETr & JAMES LAVERNE ANDERSON, THE GUN IN AMERICA: THE
ORIGINS OF A NATIONAL DILEMMA 213 (1975); DAVID B. KOPEL, THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE,
AND THE COWBOY- SHOULD AMERICA ADOPT THE GUN CONTROLS OF OTHER DEMOCRACIES?
(1992); EDWARD LEDDY, MAGNUM FORCE LOBBY: THE NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION FIGHTS
GUN CONTROL 85B89 (1987); JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, GUNS AND VIOLENCE: THE ENGLISH EXPE-
RIENCE 141B47 (2002); Stephen P. Halbrook, Nazi Firearms Law and the Disarming of the
German Jews, 17 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 483 (2000); Don B. Kates, Handgun Prohibition and
the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204, 209B10 n.23 (1983).
49. See KOPEL, supra note 48, at 141, 195, 237; MALCOLM, supra note 48, at 141B47;
Halbrook, supra note 48, at 484.
50. RESTRICTING HANDGUNS, supra note 48, at 15.
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Bar Association urged other states to follow. 5' In 1911, New York en-
acted the Sullivan Law, which required permits to buy or own a hand-
gun.52 Over the next twenty years, six more states enacted permit
requirements to buy a handgun. 53 Across the nation, complete hand-
gun bans or Sullivan-type laws were promoted under the slogan "[i]f
nobody had a gun nobody would need a gun. '54
To forestall such legislation, gun owners promoted a package of
legislative protections that came to be known as the UFA. Gun owner
lobby groups drafted and recommended the UFA as a set of moderate
gun controls to be adopted by all states instead of more severe regula-
tions. As Professor Leddy writes,
It soon became clear that if target shooters and other legal gun
owners did not want to see the lawful uses of guns completely
banned they must become active politically with a program of [less
onerous gun control] laws which would both protect gun ownership
and reduce crime. This program was the Uniform Firearms Act
[aka, the Uniform Revolver Act] .... 55
The UFA was also endorsed by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws as an antidote to what it called "the
wrong emphasis on more pistol legislation"-i.e., laws "aimed at regu-
lating pistols in the hands of law-abiding citizens." As an alternative,
the National Conference lauded the UFA approach, which it de-
scribed as "punishing severely criminals who use pistols" with "a pro-
gram of laws which would both protect arms ownership and reduce
crime." 56
As the National Rifle Association ("NRA") proclaimed, "[t]his law
was adopted in 1923 by California, North Dakota and New Hamp-
shire. '57 The UFA, as adopted by California in 1923, contained a host
of moderate regulations that form the basis of many current Califor-
nia laws, such as those prohibiting handgun possession by convicted
felons, requiring firearms dealers to be licensed, requiring that hand-
guns have serial numbers, and requiring that persons carrying them
concealed be licensed.58
51. See William B. Swaney, For a Better Enforcement of the Law, 8 A.B.A. 588, 591 (1922).
52. KENNETT & ANDERSON, supra note 48, at 174-75.
53. See RESTRICTING HANDGUNS, supra note 48, at 29.
54. KENNETT & ANDERSON, supra note 48, at 192.
55. LEDDY, supra note 48, at 87 (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 87, 88 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 88 (citation omitted).
58. Laws of 1923, ch. 339, 1923 Cal. Stat. 696, 697, 702.
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B. Penal Code Section 12026 (Current Section 12026(b))
Ironically, the California UFA was initially sponsored by an anti-
gun advocate. When introduced, it included a permit requirement to
either buy or possess a handgun.5 9 The final product, however, was a
dramatic triumph for gun owners. Not only was the permit require-
ment rejected, it was replaced by the provision from which springs
current Penal Code section 12026(b). That provision assured (and in
Penal Code section 12026(b) still assures) that law-abiding, responsi-
ble adults would never be subject to a licensing or permit law-i.e., a
law that arrogates to localities the power to permit or ban handgun
possession for people whom state law allows to own handguns. 60 Cur-
rently this handgun rights portion of section 12026 reads:
(b) No permit or license to purchase, own, possess, keep, or carry,
either openly or concealed, shall be required of any citizen of the
United States or legal resident over the age of 18 years who resides
or is temporarily within this state, and who is not within the ex-
cepted classes prescribed by Section 12021 or 12021.1 of this code
[related to certain persons convicted of crimes and to narcotics
addicts] or Section 8100 or 8103 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code [related to persons with mental disorders], to purchase, own,
possess, keep, or carry, either openly or concealed, a pistol, re-
volver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the per-
son within the citizen's or legal resident's place of residence, place
of business, or on private property owned or lawfully possessed by
the citizen or legal resident.
In enacting (and subsequently reenacting) what is now section
12026(b), the Legislature decided that, in general, the benefits of al-
lowing the law-abiding, responsible adult population to possess hand-
guns outweigh the dangers. This policy objective is confirmed by a
contemporaneous comment concerning California's adoption of the
UFA, including what is now Penal Code section 12026(b). TheJuly 15,
1923 San Francisco Chronicle reported that "[i]t was largely on the
recommendation of R.T. McKissick, president of the Sacramento Rifle
and Revolver Club, that Governor Richardson [signed the UFA].'61
The Chronicle quoted McKissick's endorsement of the UFA as
"frankly an effort upon the part of those who know something about
firearms to forestall the flood of fanatical legislation intended to de-
prive all citizens of the United States of the right to own and use, for
59. See 14 AM. INST. CRAM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 135 (1923B24) (setting forth section
three of the UFA, which establishes the permit requirement).
60. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12026(b) (West 2000).
61. New Firearms Law Effective on August 7, S.F. CHRON., July 15, 1923, at 3.
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legitimate purposes, firearms capable of being concealed upon the
person."62
Obviously, this policy is highly controversial. Yet, however debata-
ble the wisdom of that policy may be, that debate must occur in the
legislature. Whether section 12026(b) is "ill or well founded in point
of mere policy, is a matter, however, with which [udges] cannot con-
cern [themselves] .... "63
Thus, as to section 12026(b), each of the factors the California
Supreme Court holds that courts must address in interpreting a stat-
ute64 may be summarized as follows. As to "the history of the times,"
the early twentieth century was a period in which either bans on hand-
gun possession or sales, or permit requirements to buy or possess
handguns, were being enacted in other states and all over the world.
As to the context of the statute's preclusion of such legislation, it turns
out that section 12026 was enacted instead of-and in contradiction
to-a permit requirement to possess a handgun. As to "the object in
view," that object was to protect gun ownership by law-abiding, respon-
sible adults. Finally, as to "the evil to be remedied," that evil was the
proposal to ban handguns or to require a permit to buy or possess
them in the home or office.
To the same effect, it is pertinent to note the inconsistency be-
tween handgun bans and the UFA's rationale, as discussed by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The
Conference promoted the UFA against "the wrong emphasis on more
pistol legislation" -i.e., laws "aimed at regulating pistols in the hands
of law abiding citizen." By contrast, the statute's approach was to "pun-
ish[ ] severely criminals who use pistols" with "a program of laws
which would both protect arms ownership and reduce crime. ' 65
C. The "Right" to Acquire and Possess Handguns
When San Francisco enacted a handgun registration ordinance
in 1969, it was challenged as a violation of section 12026 on the
ground that it was a local law requiring a permit to own handguns.
The California Supreme Court rejected that challenge, holding that a
registration law only requires that handguns be "registered,"66 which
62. Id.
63. Atherton v. Bd. of Supervisors, 48 Cal. 157, 160 (1874).
64. Harry Carian Sales v. Agric. Labor Relations Bd., 703 P.2d 27, 36 (Cal. 1985).
65. LEDDY, supra note 48, at 87, 88 (emphasis added).
66. Galvan v. Super. Ct., 452 P.2d 930, 935 (Cal. 1969).
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is not at all the same as exercising the power section 12026 forbids to
localities to "permit" or "license" handgun possession. 6
7
Significantly, the opinion described the "no license or permit
shall be required" language of section 12026 as conferring a "right"
upon California's residents to possess handguns in the privacy of their
own homes and businesses, stating:
In 1923, the provision prohibiting carrying concealed firearms
without a license was changed to concealable weapons (Stats. 1923,
ch. 339, § 2, at p. 696), and a paragraph addedCsubstantially, Penal
Code section 12026, that "no permit or license" could be required
to possess a firearm at one's residence or place of business. ... The
Legislature intended that the right to possess a weapon at certain places
could not be circumscribed by imposing any requirements .... 68
Another and allied aspect of Galvan that gun ban advocates have
ignored are the broad (and dictionary-preferred) meanings Galvan
gave to the concepts of "permit" and "license" in Penal Code section
12026. Gun ban advocates read section 12026 narrowly as only prohib-
iting localities from enacting ordinances by which handgun posses-
sion depends on the locality issuing the owner a specific document
called a license or permit. According to this reading, localities are free
to ban handguns entirely so long as the ban is not in the form of a
requirement that possessing a handgun is lawful only for people hav-
ing a permit or license. This is the argument San Francisco presented
in Doe, and the one defendant cities and amici supporting them have
argued in subsequent cases. 69
The only court that has considered this argument rejected it, stat-
ing that implicit in section 12026's preclusion of local permit or li-
cense requirements is that the Legislature did not want localities
banning handguns.70 Moreover, the argument is precluded by the
broad definition Galvan gave the concept "license" as used in section
67. Id.
68. Id. at 934-35 (emphasis added).
69. See, e.g., Brief of LCAV as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents' Opposition to
Writ of Mandate at 12-18, Fiscal v. City & County of San Francisco, No. CPF-05-505960
(Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 2006). This was not, however, directly argued by San Francisco in
FiscaL In the Superior Court, San Francisco accepted that the Court of Appeal decision in
Doe had bindingly rejected that argument and held that the entire field of residential hand-
gun possession is preempted by state law. In its present appeal, however, San Francisco
argues that the Court of Appeal should disavow Doe in that respect. See Appellant's Open-
ing Brief at 30-34, Fiscal v. City & County of San Francisco, No. A115018 (Cal. Ct. App.
Dec. 28, 2006) (on file with authors).
70. "It strains reason to suggest that the state Legislature would prohibit licenses and
permits but allow a ban on possession." Doe v. City & County of San Francisco, 186 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 385 (Ct. App. 1982).
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12026. 71 In construing that statute, Galvan did not even mention the
narrow secondary definition of licensing as involving a physical docu-
ment or certificate issued by a government agency.72 Rather, the Gal-
van court went to great lengths to define the concept of "license"
broadly as "permission or authority to do a particular thing or exercise
a particular privilege. '73 It was based on that broad definition that the
court in Galvan upheld San Francisco's handgun registration require-
ment. That requirement did not violate section 12026 because regis-
tering a handgun would not impinge on the owner's right to have
one, which is what the statute is about, according to Galvan. The court
emphasized that registration requires no more than that owners dis-
close what handguns they possess and does not at all imply that the
locality has the authority to preclude handgun possession.74
This reasoning of the Galvan decision demonstrates that section
12026 precludes localities from enacting handgun bans. In choosing
to rest its holding on this foundation, the Galvan court necessarily
implied that an ordinance that did arrogate to a locality the power to
dictate whether handguns may be owned or possessed would violate
section 12026. This was further clarified by the broad definition Gal-
van chose for licensing. From this, it is clear that section 12026 de-
prives localities of licensing power over handgun acquisition and/or
possession-i.e., any power to ban acquisition and/or possession of a
handgun that state law allows law-abiding responsible adults to ac-
quire and possess. 75
71. Galvan, 452 P.2d at 933.
72. Where a dictionary gives multiple meanings for a word, courts will accept the first
dictionary meaning over a subsequent one. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125,
128-29 (1998). The preferred dictionary meanings of "license" and "permit" refer to any
kind of government permission to do something rather than being narrowly limited to the
issuance of a specific document giving permission. Compare WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNA-
BRIDGED DICrIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1989) (defining "license" as: "1. permis-
sion to do or not to do something. 2. Formal permission from a constituted authority to do
something. [or] 3. a certificate of such permission; an official permit .... "), with BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 829 (5th ed. 1979) (defining "license" broadly as "[t]he permission by
competent authority to do an act which, without such permission, would be illegal, a tres-
pass, or a tort.").
73. Galvan, 452 P.2d at 933.
74. After Galvan held that section 12026 did not bar local registration requirements,
the Legislature enacted GOVERNMENT CODE section 53071 (West 1997), which bans such
requirements, or local licensing, as to any kind of firearm, notjust handguns. See discussion
infra Part lI.D.
75. CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE section 12026 (West 2000) specifies that the right it cre-
ates is granted only to persons who may acquire handguns under state law. CALIFORNIA
PENAL CODE sections 12021, 12021.1, and 12101 (West 2000) prohibit guns tojuveniles and
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The analogy the Galvan court drew to voting is instructive in this
respect. The opinion distinguished registering people to vote from "li-
censing" people to vote. 76 Licensing people to vote, Galvan said,
means fixing the qualifications for voting; in contrast, registering vot-
ers involves only listing those who have met the required qualifica-
tions. 77 Of course, "licensing" in the sense of determining the
qualifications for voting does not involve issuing a physical certificate
called a license or permit.
In sum, the Galvan decision shows that Penal Code section 12026
preempts local attempts to ban handguns by establishing the exclusiv-
ity of state laws in fixing the qualifications for handgun acquisition
and ownership.
D. California Government Code Section 53071
In 1970, displeased with the Galvan result allowing handgun re-
gistration requirements, the Legislature enacted a new statute, Gov-
ernment Code section 9619, to supersede Galvan in that respect.
Authored by Senator H.L. Richardson, a member of the NRA Na-
tional Board of Directors, that statute later became Government Code
section 53071. 78
Section 53071 expressly declares the Legislature's intent to oc-
cupy the entire field of firearm registration and licensing to the exclu-
sion of local governments. 79 Further, section 53071 prohibits "all local
regulations, relating to registration or licensing of commercially manu-
factured firearms . . .80
Since it was written in response to Galvan, section 53071 used the
terms "licensing" and "registration" as Galvan defined them. That is to
say, what section 53071 denies localities is the power to license 81 fire-
persons who have been convicted of certain crimes. CALIFORNIA WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS
CODE section 8103 (West 1999) excludes people of unsound mind from owning guns.
76. Galvan, 452 P.2d at 933-34.
77. Id. at 933-34 ("licensing regulates activity based on a determination of the per-
sonal qualifications of the licensee, while registration catalogs all persons with respect to an
activity, or all things that fall within certain classifications. Thus, voter registration lists
merely enumerate all those persons who satisfy the [voting] requirements (are 'licensed) to
vote.") (emphasis added).
78. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 53071 (West 1997).
79. Id.
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. Section 53071 also prohibits localities from requiring that firearms be registered.
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arms-i.e., the "permission or authority to do a particular thing or
exercise a particular privilege."8 2
E. Legislative Policy Recognition of the Social Utility of Private
Gun Ownership
Local legislation is contrary to state law, and thus preempted, if it
is "inimical" to accomplishment of the state law's policies.83 The ratio-
nale of ordinances like Proposition H-that guns are never an accept-
able solution-contradicts and undermines multiple state laws,
including section 12026. Separately and together, all of these laws es-
tablish that in some circumstances state policy regards guns as part of
the answer to violent crime.
For instance, Penal Code section 12050 provides that upon a
showing of good cause, any law-abiding, responsible adult of "good
moral character" can obtain a license to carry a concealed loaded
handgun ("CCW") in public. 84 Even without a CCW license, Penal
Code sections 12025.5 and 12031(j) (2) create special exceptions
whereby law-abiding, responsible adults who have been threatened
and who obtain a restraining order may carry a loaded and concealed
handgun.85 Also, sections 12027(a) and 12031(b)(1) expressly allow
civilians to possess concealed and loaded handguns when summoned
to assist police in making an arrest or preserving the peace.86 Penal
Code section 12031 (k) permits possession of a loaded gun when mak-
ing a citizen's arrest.87 Penal Code section 12031() (1) allows posses-
sion of a loaded firearm in public when a person has a reasonable
belief that he or she is in immediate grave danger and the gun is nec-
essary to protect person or property.88 Though brandishing a firearm
is illegal, Penal Code section 417 provides that brandishing in self-
defense is not a crime.89 These laws provide a decisive backdrop to
Penal Code section 12026(b)'s declaration that trustworthy adults may
82. Galvan, 452 P.2d at 933.
83. Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of L.A., 844 P.2d 534, 536 (Cal. 1993).
84. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12050 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006).
85. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12025.5, 12031(j)(2) (West 2000).
86. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12027(a), 12031(b)(1) (West 2000).
87. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12031(k) (West 2000).
88. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12031(j)(1) (West 2000). Under PENAL CODE section 12026,
law-abiding responsible adults are entitled to possess firearms (even concealed ones) on
their own premises. Section 12031 generally prohibits possession of loaded firearms
outside of one's own premises, but section 12031 (j)(1) exempts from this prohibition peo-
ple who are in immediate reasonable fear.
89. CAL. PENAL CODE § 417 (West 1999).
Winter 2007] LOCAL GUN BANS IN SAN FRANCISCO
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
possess handguns in their homes and offices, 90 and to Government
Code section 53071's cognate preclusion of local prohibitions of all
firearms.9'
It is undeniable that one class benefited by this statutory scheme;
private citizens who have not, through some demonstration of per-
sonal disability or irresponsibility, lost their right to own a gun. If the
Legislature saw guns, or handguns, as only part of the crime problem,
then the almost one-hundred pages of non-annotated state gun laws
could be drastically shortened and simplified by just banning civilian
handgun or firearm possession outright. Tellingly, the Legislature de-
clined to take that approach. Rather, the state gun laws painstakingly
set out myriad licensing schemes and exceptions and exemptions to
permit trustworthy individuals to own guns to enforce the laws, de-
fend property, or defend their lives, homes, and families.
These exceptions to the state's general statutory prohibitions,
coupled with protections provided in Penal Code section 12026 and
Government Code section 53071, express and reflect the state's policy
determination that under certain circumstances armed civilians con-
tribute to the statewide crime prevention effort. Simply put, the state
has taken a two-pronged approach to respond to the statewide prob-
lem of criminal misuse of firearms: (1) it has denied access to firearms
for those deemed most likely to misuse them; and (2) it protects the
"right" of law-abiding citizens, active and retired law enforcement, and
others to own and use firearms as a deterrent to criminal activity.
In sum, state law endorses handgun possession for self-defense,
defense of others, and defense of property. Whether the state pro-
motes or merely protects the possession of handguns by civilians to
deter crime, the philosophy underlying the state regulatory scheme
conflicts diametrically with the position taken by gun ban advocates.
Moreover, a careful review of the state's policy, as reflected in its over-
all regulatory scheme and the provisions of sections 12026 and 53071,
clarifies the scope of the First District Court of Appeal's decision in
Doe as well as the failed attempts by gun ban advocates to limit the
scope of that decision.
90. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12026(b) (West 2000).
91. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53071 (West 1997).
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HI. Doe v. City and County of San Francisco
In 1982, San Francisco's then-Mayor Dianne Feinstein proposed
an ordinance banning and confiscating handguns. 92 The ordinance
purported to ban the possession of all handguns except for a very few
exemptions.93 Among those was an exemption for active law enforce-
ment and military personnel.94
On August 3, 1982, after the ordinance was proposed but before
its enactment, the California Attorney General issued an opinion at
the request of Senator Bill Richardson addressing the issue of whether
a city could enact such legislation.95 The opinion concluded that such
an ordinance would be invalid and that the area of residential hand-
gun possession was preempted by state law.96
San Francisco enacted the ordinance anyway after a 6-5 vote of
the city's legislative body, the Board of Supervisors. In response, two
mandamus actions were filed as original matters in the California
Court of Appeal. One of these actions, which was sponsored by the
NRA, was brought on behalf of gun stores and gun owners.97 The
chief counsel for these petitioners was now-Chief Federal District
Court Judge Vaughn Walker, who was then a lawyer with Pillsbury,
Madison & Sutro.98 The other suit was sponsored by a rival gun lobby
group, the Second Amendment Foundation, and brought by an ex-
perienced civil rights practitioner, co-author of this article, Don
Kates.99 The petitioners in that action included the five dissenting
members of the Board of Supervisors headed by its then-president
(now Judge) Quentin Kopp, as well as: a welfare recipient, a stock
broker, a gay lawyer, an African-American minister, a Latina business-
woman and private detective, the publisher of the nation's largest gay
92. See Mary Anne Ostrom, S.F. Voters Consider Tough Handgun Ban, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Nov. 4, 2005, at 12A ("In the wake of the 1978 handgun slayings of then Mayor
George Moscone and supervisor Harvey Milk, one of Dianne Feinstein's first acts as Mos-
cone's replacement was to enact a handgun ban. It was struck down a couple of years later,
however, by the state Supreme Court. Feinstein, now a U.S. Senator, is not taking a posi-




95. 65 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 457 (1982).
96. Id.
97. See Pet. for Writ of Mandate, Req. for Temporary Stay Order and Mem. in Support
Thereof at 1-3, Soracco v. City & County of San Francisco, No. A018445 (Cal. Ct. App. July
16, 1982).
98. Doe v. City & County of San Francisco, 186 Cal. Rptr. 380, 380 (Ct. App.1982).
99. Id.
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newspaper, and an elderly woman who had lived in San Francisco all
of her life, declaring that she did not intend to give up the handgun
she kept for her protection, law or no law.100
The First District Court of Appeal consolidated the two actions
and unanimously held the ordinance to be contrary to section 12026
and preempted by section 53071.101
A. The Holdings in Doe
Doe found the ordinance invalid on three independent grounds.
First, the court held that it was expressly preempted under section
53071 as a licensing law. 10 2 The ordinance banned handgun posses-
sion for all except a special few people (termed express or de facto
licensees), most notably those with a state permit to carry a concealed
firearm. 10 3 This local ban violated section 53071's declaration that
state licensing and registration provisions are exclusive. 10 4 The Doe
court further invoked section 53071's preemption of local licensing
laws or those "relating to licensing," stating that even if the ordinance
is not "a direct licensing requirement, [it] is at least a local regulation
relating to licensing.'0 5
Second, having concluded the issues under section 53071, the
court reiterated that "[t]he San Francisco Handgun Ordinance does
create a license requirement for one seeking to possess a handgun at
home .... 106 Accordingly, the court found that the 1982 ban con-
flicted with the plain wording of section 12026 that "no permit or li-
cense shall be required."'01 7 The court also noted rather pointedly that
"'[n]o permit or license' means 'no permit or license."'" 08
Finally, Doe concluded that even if the 1982 ordinance did not
impose a "licensing" requirement, the ordinance would still be invalid
because section 12026 (now section 12026(b)) implicitly preempts lo-
cal handgun bans.
100. See Pet. for Writ of Mandate Against Handgun Ban, Req. for Temporary Stay Or-
der and Mem. in Support Thereof at 1, 3, 4, Doe v. City & County of San Francisco, No.
A018441 (Cal. Ct. App. July 19, 1982).
101. Doe, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
102. Id. at 384.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 384.
105. Id.
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[W]e infer from Penal Code section 12026 that the Legislature in-
tended to occupy the field of residential handgun possession to the
exclusion of local governmental entities. A restriction on requiring
permits and licenses necessarily implies that possession is lawful
without a permit or license. It strains reason to suggest that the state
Legislature would prohibit licenses and permits but allow a ban on
possession. 1
09
This is the controversial language of Doe, which has prompted
countless subsequent attacks on the case as well as on sections 12026
and 53071.110 As emphasized in innumerable California Supreme
Court cases, the goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain what
the legislature's intent was in enacting the law being construed."1 '
Thus, the decisive question is: for what reason other than protecting
handgun acquisition and possession would the 1923 Legislature have
barred localities from requiring a permit or license in order for one to
acquire or possess a handgun? A fortiori, if that was not section 12026's
purpose, why would three subsequent legislatures have reenacted it
without disavowing Doe's conclusion that section 12026 bars localities
from banning handguns? Significantly, not one of the dozens of briefs
assailing Doe that have been filed in various later cases have attempted
what is required by the whole enterprise of statutory construction-
suggesting some purpose for section 12026 other than that the Legisla-
ture wanted to protect the right to acquire and possess handguns. Nor
is it possible to imagine any reason why the Legislature would have
precluded localities from enacting handgun permit or license laws
109. Id. (emphasis added). The last sentence in the passage has been italicized because
it is both indubitably correct and decisive of the issue of whether localities can ban
handguns.
110. In 1984, two years after the decision in Doe, California state Proposition 15, a mas-
sive collection of anti-gun laws, was brought to the ballot by anti-gun advocates but de-
feated by the electorate. One feature of Proposition 15 was to repeal sections 12026 and
53071. Repeal or evisceration of one or both of those statutes has been a feature of numer-
ous subsequent legislative proposals to allow localities to ban guns. See, e.g., Assemb. B. 136,
1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997); Assemb. B. 247, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997); S.B.
643, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997); Assemb. B. 634, 1995 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995),
which was identical to Assemb. B. 2706, 1993 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1993) rejected in the
1993-94 session. Other approaches to the same effect from the 1993-94 session included
S.B. 1293, 1993 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1993); Assemb. B. 2865, 1993 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
1993); and Assemb. B. X1 37, 1993 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1993). The passage from Doe
quoted in the text above has also been assailed in numerous amicus briefs filed by organi-
zations and cities in cases involving local gun bans, including in Doe and Cal. Rifle & Pistol
Ass'n v. City of West Hollywood, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 591 (Ct. App. 1998).
111. See, e.g., People v. Acosta, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 435, 440 (Ct. App. 2002) ("[O]ur
fundamental task ... is to determine the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's
purpose.") (citation omitted); Lesher Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 802 P.2d
317, 324 (Cal. 1990) ("Basic to all statutory construction, however, is ascertaining and im-
plementing the intent of the adopting body.").
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other than to preclude localities from limiting the access of law-abid-
ing, responsible people to handguns. 112
In light of section 12026's legislative history-and in abeyance of
any other viable theory of its purpose-Doe must be deemed correct in
holding that the legislative intent of the statute was to preclude local
handgun bans and occupy the field of residential handgun possession
to the exclusion of contrary local legislation.
B. Attacking Doe
Predictably, ever since the Doe opinion came down, its conclusion
has been subject to various attacks by gun ban advocates and by locali-
ties arguing for the validity of their gun laws.
1. CRPA v. West Hollywood
One authority cited against Doe is the Second District Court of
Appeal's 1998 opinion in California Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. City of West
Hollywood"n3 ("CRPA"), which upheld a local ban on the sale of a spe-
cific subclass of handguns that the ordinance defined as "Saturday
Night Specials."11 4 CRPA interpreted section 53071 to not apply to
limited local sales bans if they banned only the sale of certain kinds of
handguns but not others.1 15
The CRPA court's justification for allowing municipal regulation
of the sale of one limited type of handgun was that the state had not
addressed the whole field of handgun sales-i.e., it had not made any
determination of which handguns could or could not be sold state-
wide.'1 6 Thus, it appears that CRPA left room for some quantum local
handgun sales bans (in addition to the usual local zoning and busi-
ness license restrictions), though not a flat handgun sales ban.117
112. The only other conceivable explanation for what is now section 12026(b) is that
the 1923 Legislature and several subsequent ones were opposed to permit or licensing laws
per se. This cannot be the case for the 1923 UFA, which originated section 12026 two
handgun license programs in different contexts. See Laws of 1923, ch. 339, § 5 (prohibiting
concealed carry without a license), § 8 (license to carry a concealed handgun), and § 11
(license to operate a gun store) at 697-99, 701.
113. 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 591 (Ct. App. 1998).
114. As discussed in Part IV infra, the Legislature subsequently enacted a scheme to
deal with "Saturday Night Specials" which uses actual testing and criteria for safety and
reliability, and which the Legislature recognized would preempt forty or so city ordinances
following and including West Hollywood's.
115. CRPA, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596.
116. Id.
117. As discussed in Part IV infra, this is no longer the case regarding the Unsafe Hand-
gun Act ("UHA") (CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12125-12133 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006)). In enact-
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However, the opinion itself presents insuperable problems for
any attempt to portray CRPA as conflicting with Doe. The court in
CRPA distinguished Doe from sections 12026 and 53071, on the
ground that they preclude local bans on the purchase and possession
of all handguns, not bans on the sale of only specific types of hand-
guns. As the CRPA court stated:
In Doe .... San Francisco had enacted a ban on possession of
handguns. Exempt from the ban, however, were those who pos-
sessed licenses under state law either to carry or to sell handguns.
Thus possession of handguns in the home (which was specifically
allowed under Penal Code section 12026 without any license or
permit) was facially prohibited unless the possessor had a license.
The court found that the effect was "to create a new class of per-
sons who will be required to obtain licenses in order to possess
handguns." . . . Government Code section 53071, however, ex-
pressly preempted the whole field of licensing requirements. The
court concluded that the city had in effect created a licensing re-
quirement for handguns in the home in violation of the express
preemption of that field in Government Code section 53071.118
But, as to the validity of local wholesale handgun bans, the CRPA
opinion went on:
Doe also noted that even if it did not consider the ordinance to
contain a de facto licensing requirement, it would nevertheless
find the ordinance impliedly preempted on the theory that Penal
Code section 12026 (which preempts local requirements for per-
mits or licenses to possess concealable weapons in the home) re-
flected a legislative intent to occupy the field of "residential
handgun possession." However, the Doe court also noted that the
decisions "suggest that the Legislature has not prevented local gov-
ernmental bodies from regulating all aspects of the possession of
firearms," and that "[i] t is at least arguable that the state Legisla-
ture's adoption of numerous gun regulations has not impliedly
preempted all areas of gun regulation.""l 9
In this way, the court in CRPA interpreted and accepted Doe as
precluding bans on handgun possession on private property. For ex-
ample, in listing discrete areas of regulation fully preempted by state
law, the CRPA court stated:
In summary, the Legislature has expressly declared that the City
may not require the licensing or registration of firearms. (Gov.
ing the UHA, the Legislature has addressed and preempted the field, including an express
declaration that handguns which meet the UHA's testing and registration requirements
firearms "may be sold" within the state. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12131 (a) (West 2000 & Supp.
2006).
118. CRPA, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599.
119. Id. (citing Doe v. City & County of San Francisco, 186 Cal. Rptr. 380, 384-85 (Ct.
App. 1982)).
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Code, § 53071.) The Legislature has also declared that the City
may not require permits or licenses to purchase, own, possess,
keep, or carry a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being
concealed within a place of residence, place of business, or on pri-
vate property lawfully owned or lawfully possessed. (Pen. Code,
§ 12026.) ... 120
Thus, the court interpreted the issue before it as a regulation of
the sale of some specific types of handguns, not as an outright hand-
gun sales ban. It took pains to distinguish the situation before it from
Doe. Far from rejecting Doe, the court acknowledged without cavil that
Doe had found the area of "residential handgun possession" a pre-
empted field; it did not treat that finding as mere dictum that later
courts could ignore.
This brings us to the central problem with the CRPA opinion: it
fails, without even discussing the issue, to give effect to the express
language of section 12026 regarding handgun sales. Section 12026
guarantees law-abiding, responsible adult Californians the right "to
purchase, own, possess, [and] keep handguns."121 Thus, the distinction
the CRPA court tried to draw between the West Hollywood ordinance
as a sales ban and the possession ban ordinance Doe invalidated is illu-
sory. Doe's holding that section 12026 guarantees law-abiding, respon-
sible adults a right to own a handgun necessarily accepts that they
equally have the right to buy handguns.
Nevertheless, CRPA left cities at least some leeway to ban the sale
of a subset of guns based on their deeming that subset to present
some special danger to public safety above and beyond the dangers
presented by handguns in general. In enacting section 12026, the Leg-
islature was obviously aware of the well-known, though often exagger-
ated, dangers of handguns. 122 Nevertheless, the Legislature has
necessarily adjudged the public benefits of handgun ownership to, in
general, outweigh the dangers. 123 Pursuant to section 12026, localities
are deprived of any power to comprehensively outlaw handgun posses-
sion on private property.
120. Id. at 597.
121. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12026 (West 2000) (emphasis added).
122. See infra Part III.B.2.
123. Recall the UFA's rationale, as enunciated by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, grew out of "the wrong emphasis on more pistol legisla-
tion"-i.e., laws "aimed at regulating pistols in the hands of law abiding citizen." The UFA
approach (and that of California gun law generally) is to "punish [ ] severely criminals who
use pistols" with "a program of laws which would both protect arms ownership and reduce
crime." LEDDY, supra note 48, at 87, 88 (emphasis added).
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Given Doe, Sippel, and section 12026's creation of an express "enti-
tle [ment]" to purchase handguns, the most that can be said is that, at
the time it was decided, CRPA left cities some leeway to ban sales of a
subset of guns based on that subset being deemed to present dangers
to public safety above and beyond the dangers represented by hand-
guns in general. But Doe's conclusion remains that Penal Code section
12026 precludes any local handgun ban, for "[i] t strains reason to sug-
gest that the state Legislature would prohibit licenses and permits but
allow a ban on possession." 12 4 In any event, CRPA's conclusion that
localities may ban sales of certain handguns became invalid with the
enactment of the Unsafe Handgun Act.125
2. The Social Dangers of Handguns
The dangers of guns in the hands of violent criminals or the de-
ranged are self-evident and attested by tragic experience. But Califor-
nia and federal law already prohibit juveniles, the insane, convicted
felons, and violent misdemeanants from owning guns.1 26 In contrast,
England, Canada, Australia, Jamaica, and Ireland have banned and
confiscated all handguns or large numbers of handguns and other
guns. 127 The experience with such laws demonstrates that they do not
124. Doe v. City & County of San Francisco, 186 Cal. Rptr. 380, 385 (Ct. App. 1982).
Actually, Doe is somewhat misleading in describing PENAL CODE section 12026 as a "pre-
emption law." Section 12026 is "the Legislature's recognition of the right [of law-abiding,
responsible adults] to possess handguns on private property." 77 Op. Cal. Att'y. Gen. 147,
152 (1994). Thus, section 12026 is not your usual preemption law because it is not ad-
dressed to localities specifically. It creates a right which is applicable against any level or
agency of government until the Legislature sees fit to alter it. However, section 12026 can
be seen as a preemption law in the sense of preempting local handgun bans "contradictory
to" the statute. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12026 (West 2000); see also Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City
of L.A., 844 P.2d 534, 536 (Cal. 1993) (stating that local laws are preempted if contrary to
state law).
125. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12125-12133 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006).
126. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 12021(a) (West 2000) (prohibiting firearms posses-
sion by convicted felons and narcotics addicts); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12021, 12021.1(c)
(prohibiting firearms possession by persons convicted of certain misdemeanor, and refer-
ring to juveniles convicted of felonies as adults); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 8103 (West
1998 & Supp. 2006) (prohibiting firearms possession by those judged to be a danger to
others as a result of a mental disorder, by persons who have been found not guilty of
certain crimes by reason of insanity, and by persons who have been found mentally incom-
petent to stand trial, among others). See also 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2000).
127. Gary A. Mauser, Have Restrictive Firearm Laws Improved Public Safety? An Evalu-
ation of the Firearm Laws in the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, the Republic of Ire-
land and Jamaica (Dec. 1, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The University of
San Francisco Law Review).
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disarm violent criminals, who instead just disobey these laws.128 For
instance, when England banned handguns in 1997, law-abiding own-
ers turned in over 166,000 of them. "Yet that left untold numbers in
criminal hands" and did not stop the "illegal importation of millions
more guns."1 29 Five years later, "England's National Crime Intelli-
gence Service lamented that while 'Britain has some of the strictest
gun laws in the world [i]t appears that anyone who wishes to obtain a
firearm [illegally] will have little difficulty in doing so.' "130
A recent comprehensive study summarizes England's gun law and
gun experience as follows:
The peacefulness England used to enjoy was not the result of strict
gun laws. When it had no firearms restrictions [during the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries] England had little violent
crime, while the present extraordinarily stringent gun controls
have not stopped the increase in violence or even the increase in
armed violence .... 131
This same study goes on to note that
[a]rmed crime, never before a problem in England, has now be-
come one. Handguns are banned but the kingdom has millions of
illegal firearms. Criminals have no trouble finding them and ex-
hibit a new willingness to use them. In the decade after 1957 the
use of guns in serious crime increased one hundredfold. 13 2
In short, the actual effect of banning guns to the general populace is
that only those who are of no danger comply, while those who are
violent do not comply and cannot be disarmed. Banning guns just
deprives victims of what is the most effective-and often the only-
weapon that allows them to resist the violent.1 33 "Only a gun can allow
128. For discussions of gun-banning nations's experiences see DAVID B. KOPEL, THE
SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE, AND THE COWBOY SHOULD AMERICA ADOPT THE GUN CONTROLS OF
OTHER DEMOCRACIES? (1992); David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne D. Eisen, Microdis-
armament: The Consequences for Public Safety and Human Rights, 73 UMKC L. REv. 969 (2005);
Don B. Kates, The Limits of Gun Control: A Criminological Perspective, in SUING THE FIREARMS
INDUSTRY- A LEGAL BATrLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS
(Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005); Don B. Kates & Gary Mauser, Would Banning Firearms Reduce
Murder and Suicide: A Review of International Evidence, 30 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcom-
ing 2007).
129. Don B. Kates, The Hopelessness of Trying to Disarm the Kind of People Who Murder, 12
BRIDGES 313, 319 (2005).
130. Id. (emphasis added).
131. See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, GUNS AND VIOLENCE: THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE 219
(2002).
132. Id. at 209.
133. "Reliable, durable, and easy to operate, modem firearms are the most effective
means of self-defense ever devised. They require minimal maintenance and, unlike knives
and other weapons, do not depend on an individual's physical strength for their effective-
ness. Only a gun can allow a 110-pound woman to defend herself easily against a 200-
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a 110-pound woman to defend herself easily against a 200-pound
man."134
At the same time, disarming the responsible law-abiding populace
negligibly affects violence rates because violent crimes are committed
by a small minority of extreme aberrants, not the general populace.
Only fifteen percent of Americans in general have a criminal record
of any kind, 13 5 but the overwhelming majority of serious violent
criminals have arrests (generally many), '13 6 as well as histories of severe
mental problems 137 and/or of prior violence.138 According to crimi-
nologist Delbert Elliot, the whole corpus of modern criminological
research demonstrates that murderers, robbers, and other life-threat-
ening criminals "almost uniformly have a long history of [prior] involve-
ment in criminal behavior."13 9
In short, the criminological evidence validates California's long
established pattern of outlawing handguns for criminals and the in-
pound man." Linda Gorman & David B. Kopel, Self-Defense: The Equalizer, 15 F. FOR APPLIED
RES. & PUB. POL'Y 92 (2000).
134. Id. See also Hans Toch & Alan J. Lizotte, Research and Policy: The Case of Gun Control,
in PSYCHOL. & Soc. POL'V 234 (1992) ("when used for protection, firearms can seriously
inhibit aggression and can provide a psychological buffer against the fear of crime. Fur-
thermore, the fact that national patterns show little violent crime where guns are most
dense implies that guns do not elicit aggression in any meaningful way.").
135. Mark Cooney, The Decline of Elite Homicide, 35 CRIMINOLOGY 381, 386 (1997).
136. See Dean G. Rojek, The Homicide and Drug Connection, inPAUL H. BIACKMIAN ET AL.,
THE VARIETIES OF HOMICIDE AND ITS RESEARCH 135 (2000) (noting that exclusive of all
other offenses they may have had, eighty percent of Atlanta murder arrestees in 1997 had
at least one prior drug offense); Anthony A. Braga et al., Understanding and Preventing Gang
Violence: Problem Analysis and Response Development in Lowell, Massachusetts, 9 POLICE Q. 20,
29-30 (2006) (noting that " [ s]ome 95% of homicide offenders, [and] 82% of aggravated
gun assault offenders," had previously been "arraigned at least once in Massachusetts
courts. .. ."); FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT-1975 at 43 (showing that homicide arrestees
nationally over five-year period had adult records showing an average prior criminal career
of at least six years duration including four major felony arrests).
137. See, e.g., Sheilagh Hodgins, Mental Disorder, Intellectual Deficiency, and Crime, 49
ARCH. GEN. PSYCH. 476 (1992) (collecting such studies); Wade C. Myers & Kerrilyn Scott,
Psychotic and Conduct Disorder Symptoms in Juvenile Murderers, 2 HOMICIDE STUD. 160 (1998)
(noting that psychological studies of juvenile murderers variously find that eighty to one
hundred percent are psychotic or have psychotic symptoms); Pekka Santilla & Jaana
Haapasalo, Neurological and Psychological Risk Factors Among Young Homicidal, Violent, and
Nonviolent Offenders in Finland, 1 HOMICIDE STUD. 234 (1997) (summarizing American and
foreign studies on the extensive psychiatric histories of murderers).
138. See, e.g., Paige Hall-Smith et al., Partner Homicide in Context, 2 HOMICIDE STUD. 400,
410 (1998). In a study of North Carolina wife-murders, prior wife beating had occurred in
almost ninety-six percent of cases. Id.
139. Delbert S. Elliott, Life-Threatening Violence is Primarily a Crime Problem: A Focus on
Prevention, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 1081, 1089 (1998) (emphasis added).
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sane while guaranteeing their possession for the law-abiding, responsi-
ble adult populace.
3. Is the Holding from Doe Dictum?
Another avenue of attack against Doe claims that its conclusion-
that localities cannot ban handguns-is dictum, since the actual basis
on which Doe invalidated the 1982 ordinance was that it was a permit
law, forbidden under section 12026.140
But to claim that the language quoted above is mere dictum is to
make a categorical error, the category in question being the concept
of alternative holdings. Whenever a party presents an argument that
the court rejects on two separate grounds, those grounds are each
alternative holdings and neither is dictum. 141 In Doe, San Francisco
characterized its handgun ban as a complete ban rather than a permit
law. 142 The court responded by first stating that the ban was a permit
law within the meaning of section 12026.143 Second, it held that even
if the ordinance were not a permit law, it was a handgun ban implicitly
preempted by section 12026.144 These are alternative holdings, a con-
cept the court in Southern Cal. Chapter of Associated Builders and Contrac-
tors, Inc. v. Cal. Apprenticeship Council explains as follows:
[It is] well settled that where two independent reasons are given
for a decision, neither one is to be considered mere dictum, since
there is no more reason for calling one the real basis of the deci-
sion than the other. The ruling on both grounds is the judgment
of the court and is of equal validity. 145
Equally well settled is that a statement made in an opinion is a
holding, not dictum, if it is "relevant to the material facts before the
court."1 4 6 The issue before the Doe court was the legality of the 1982
handgun ban. Doe's reasoning that section 12026 precluded that ban,
and handgun bans in general, unquestionably addresses the material
facts before the court. Thus, it is not mere dictum. Moreover, the
140. Among the places in which this claim has been made was the amicus brief filed in
the Proposition H case by a gun prohibition advocacy, the Legal Community Against Vio-
lence. See Brief of LCAV as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents' Opposition to Writ of
Mandate at 4, Fiscal v. City & County of San Francisco, No. CPF-05-505960 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Jan. 25, 2006).
141. See Southern Cal. Chapter of Assoc. Builders v. Cal. Apprenticeship Council, 841
P.2d 1011, 1015 n.3 (Cal. 1992).
142. Doe v. City & County of San Francisco, 186 Cal. Rptr. 380, 383 (Ct. App. 1982).
143. Id. at 385.
144. Id.
145. Southern Cal., 841 P.2d at 1015 n.3 (quoting Bank of Italy Etc. Ass'n v. Bentley, 20
P.2d 940, 942 (1933)).
146. Dunn v. Super. Ct., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 368 (Ct. App. 1993).
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court in Doe clearly viewed its implied preemption ruling as an alter-
nate holding. After first addressing "express preemption," it then
presented the alternative holding under a separate heading entitled
"Implied Preemption."'1 47
In sum, Doe's conclusion that localities cannot ban handgun pos-
session is a holding. It is also compelled by section 12026's legislative
history from the 1923 UFA.148
4. Has the Legislature Reaffirmed Doe?
Another avenue taken by Doe's critics is to declare that Doe is flat
out wrong. In the recent litigation over San Francisco's Proposition H,
the defendant San Francisco acknowledged that it was bound by Doe
regardless of whether Doe was rightly decided.1 49 But the position that
Doe's conclusion is wrong was argued through an amicus brief filed by
the LCAV.150
As discussed above, however disagreeable some may find Doe, it
clearly was rightly decided. Moreover, Doe's critics invariably neglect a
crucial obstacle to any claim that its conclusion is wrong. That obsta-
cle is the fact that since Doe, the Legislature has reenacted Penal Code
section 12026 without change to disavow the Doe holdings; indeed, the
statute has been reenacted three times.1 51 The fact that the Legisla-
ture has revised a statute without change to disavow a prior judicial
construction of it serves to validate that construction. Also, the fact
that Doe has been reenacted, not just once but multiple times, further
ratifies Doe's interpretation of section 12026 as one that the Legisla-
ture accepts. 152
147. Doe, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
148. See discussion, supra Part II.A.
149. San Francisco conceded that the 2005 ordinance violated section 12026 as Doe had
construed that statute, but contended that the ordinance was nevertheless valid under its
"home rule" powers as a charter city. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Sup-
port of Respondents' Opposition to Motion for Writ of Mandate and/or Prohibition or
Other Appropriate Relief at 22-30, Fiscal v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 05-3674
(Cal. Super. Ct. June 12, 2006).
150. See Brief of LCAV as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents' Opposition to Writ of
Mandate at 4, Fiscal v. City & County of San Francisco, No. CPF-05-505960 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Jan. 25, 2006).
151. See Cal. Stat. ch. 322, § 1 (1995); Cal. Stat. ch. 958, § 2 (1989); Cal. Stat. ch. 577,
§ 2 (1988).
152. See People v. Bouzas, 807 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Cal. 1991); Olmstead v. ArthurJ. Gal-
lagher & Co., 86 P.3d 354, 360 (Cal. 2004); People v. Massie, 967 P.2d 29, 40B41 (Cal.
1998) (citations omitted).
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In fact, these reenactments now make Doe's holding binding,
even if it had originally been dictum. 153 A 2004 California Supreme
Court decision summarized as follows the doctrine enunciated by doz-
ens of cases dating back more than a century: "When a statute has
been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts
that statute without changing the interpretation put on that statute by
the courts, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and
acquiesced in, the courts' construction of that statute. 154
In other words, by reenacting section 12026 without expressly dis-
avowing Doe, the Legislature retroactively adopted Doe's analysis re-
gardless of whether that analysis was correct when the opinion was
delivered. Conceptually, the effect is as if the Legislature had rewrit-
ten section 12026 to incorporate the language of Doe, or with the ob-
servation that "this statute was correctly construed by the Court of
Appeal in Doe v. City and County of San Francisco." Following this case
law, the courts generally decline to even consider whether a pre-reen-
actmentjudicial construction was correct. Arguments that it was incor-
rect are irrelevant since they "do not affect our point that the
Legislature is presumed to have been aware of [the prior cases], yet
did not expressly reject this line of authority" when it reenacted the
statute the prior cases were construing. 155 Even if a reenactment
makes other changes to a statute, where those changes do not affect
the meaning of the words judicially construed, the decision constru-
ing those words is deemed to have been reaffirmed, not repudiated by
the changes in other respects. 156 By thrice reenacting section 12026
without disavowing Doe's conclusion that it preempts local handgun
bans, the Legislature conclusively validated that conclusion, even if
Doe had been wrongly decided originally.
Moreover, it is not necessary to even presume that the Legislature
was aware of Doe's conclusion that section 12026 precludes handgun
bans. The fact that the Legislature was aware of Doe is shown by its
subsequent enactment of Penal Code subsections 626.85(h) and (i).
These statutes provide that "[n]otwithstanding [s]ection 12026," stu-
dents may not have firearms in college or university-managed student
housing.'57 By prefacing those new laws with a reference to Penal
153. See Peltier v. McCloud River R.R. Co., 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182, 189 n.6 (Ct. App. 1995)
(refusing to consider arguments that a previous case's interpretation of a statute was
wrong, given that statute's reenactment without change to the language interpreted).
154. Olmstead, 86 P.3d at 360 (citations omitted).
155. Peltier, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 189 n.6.
156. Peltier, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 189 nn.6-7 (citing Bouzas, 807 P.2d at 1077-81).
157. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 626.9(h), (i) (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).
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Code section 12026,158 the Legislature demonstrated its understand-
ing that section 12026 creates a general right for law-abiding, respon-
sible adults to have handguns in their homes. It is to this generally
applicable right that Penal Code subsections 626.85(h) and (i) re-
present a special exception. Courts may not disregard such express
legislative references by a later law to an earlier one. 159
5. Has Doe Been Overruled?
In arguing that Doe was wrongly decided, the LCAV brief in the
Proposition H case relied heavily on a pair of California Supreme
Court cases. 160 In 2002, that court took up firearm preemption issues
in a pair of cases certified to it with specific questions posed by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 161 The cases involved ordinances en-
acted by Alameda and Los Angeles Counties banning gun shows at
county fairgrounds-i.e., gun bans on county-owned public prop-
erty. 162 In Great Western Shows v. County of Los Angeles, the county
sought to halt the gun shows by banning the sale of guns and ammu-
nition at the Los Angeles County Fairgrounds; 163 in Nordyke v. King,
Alameda County sought to ban possession of firearms at its fair-
grounds. 164 Because the Ninth Circuit saw a "tension" between Doe
and other appellate cases like CRPA, it referred these two gun show
cases to the California Supreme Court to answer several certified
questions. 165
The specific and narrow issues were stated unambiguously by the
California Supreme Court at the outset of Great Western. The issues
were defined as follows:
1. Does state law regulating the sale of firearms and gun shows pre-
empt a county ordinance prohibiting gun and ammunition sales
on county property?
158. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 626.9(h), (i) (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).
159. See People v. Super. Ct., 917 P.2d 628, 641 (Cal. 1996) (upholding the state legisla-
ture's express reference in a later statute to an earlier statute).
160. See Brief of LCAV as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents' Opposition to Writ of
Mandate at 4, Fiscal v. City & County of San Francisco, No. CPF-05-505960 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Jan. 25, 2006) (relying on Nordyke v. King, 44 P.3d 133 (Cal. 2002) and Great Western
Shows, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 44 P.3d 120 (Cal. 2002)).
161. Nordyke v. King, 44 P.3d 133 (Cal. 2002); Great Western Shows, Inc. v. County of
Los Angeles, 44 P.3d 120 (Cal. 2002).
162. Nordyke, 44 P.3d at 136; Great Western, 44 P.3d at 124.
163. See Great Western, 44 P.3d at 123-24.
164. See Nordyke, 44 P.3d at 136.
165. Great Western Shows, Inc. v. Los Angeles County, 229 F.3d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir.
2000) (noting that "there is tension in the reasoning underlying several decisions of the
Courts of Appeal of the State of California and an Opinion of its Attorney General").
Winter 2007]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
2. May a county, consistent with article XI, section 7 of the Califor-
nia Constitution, regulate the sale of firearms on its property lo-
cated in an incorporated city within the borders of the county?16 6
The California Supreme Court's holding in Great Western was con-
comitantly narrow, being based on the county's ability to control activ-
ities on its own property. As the opinion stated:
[A] county has broad latitude under California Government Code
section 23004, subdivision (d), to use its property, consistent with
its contractual obligations, "as the interests of its inhabitants re-
quire.".., the County is not compelled to grant access to its prop-
erty to all comers. Nor do the gun show statutes mandate that
counties use their property for such shows. If the County does al-
low such shows, it may impose more stringent restrictions on the
sale of firearms than state law prescribes.
For all the above reasons, we conclude that the Ordinance is not
preempted by the sale of firearms and/or ammunition on County
property. We do not decide whether a broader countywide ban of gun shows
would be preempted.
16 7
The court in Great Western based its decision on Los Angeles County's
discretion to use its county-owned public property to suit its needs and
on language in state statutes governing gun shows expressly contem-
plating additional local regulation. 168
As in Great Western, the court in Nordyke was faced with a narrow
issue of first impression. The question certified for review was stated
by the California Supreme Court at the outset of that opinion as
follows:
We granted the request of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, for certification pursuant to California Rules of
Court, rule 29.5 to address the following question: Does state law
regulating the possession of firearms and gun shows preempt a mu-
nicipal ordinance prohibiting gun possession on county
property?1 6
9
As it did in Great Western, the court in Nordyke relied heavily upon the
county's statutory right to regulate activities on its own property.1 70
The court answered the narrow issue presented with the following
equally narrow holding:
We further conclude that under California Government Code sec-
tion 23004, subdivision (d), a county is given substantial authority
to manage its property, including the most fundamental decision
166. Great Western, 44 P.3d at 123.
167. Id. at 130-31 (emphasis added).
168. Id. at 128 (noting that the state gun show regulations "expressly anticipate the
existence of 'applicable local laws"').
169. Nordyke, 44 P.3d at 135.
170. Id. at 137.
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as to how the property will be used, and that nothing in the gun
show statutes evince an intent to override that authority. The gun
show statutes do not mandate that counties use their property for
such shows .... In sum, whether or not the Ordinance is partially
preempted, Alameda County has the authority to prohibit the op-
eration of gun shows held on its property, and, at least to that ex-
tent, may ban possession of guns on its property.17 1
Thus, both Great Western and Nordyke stand for a narrow proposi-
tion that state gun show regulations-which expressly contemplate ad-
ditional local regulation-do not preclude local governments from
banning the sale or possession of firearms and ammunition at gun
shows on county-owned public property. Neither case addressed the va-
lidity of such laws beyond the limited context of the facts presented.
Indeed, the court in both cases went out of its way to disabuse anyone
of that notion. Also, neither case addressed banning handgun posses-
sion or sales on private property.
As noted above, the Legislature has affirmed Doe's construction of
section 12026 by thrice reenacting that statute without change. Thus,
it cannot easily be presumed that Doe has been implicitly discredited
by California Supreme Court cases construing laws other than section
12026, such as the gun show laws in Great Western and Nordyke. At the
very least, such a conclusion would have to be supported by unmistak-
able language in these two cases. In fact, however, no such language
exists. To the contrary, Great Western cited Doe approvingly.1 72 Before
Great Western turned to the specific questions presented, it first ex-
amined the whole spectrum of firearms preemption cases.173 After dis-
cussing cases where ordinances were found valid, the court noted Doe
as an example of a case where an ordinance did conflict with state
law-a case wherein the ordinance was properly preempted. 174 Thus,
far from implicitly rejecting the holding in Doe, the court implicitly
approved it, noting the "direct conflict between the statute and the
Ordinance" Doe invalidated. 175
Further, in discussing Doe, the Great Western opinion referenced
both statutes that the Doe court relied upon in finding that San Fran-
cisco's 1982 ordinance banning handgun possession conflicted with
and was preempted by state laws. 176 In short, the court recognized and
171. Id. at 137-38.
172. Great Western Shows, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 44 P.3d 120, 126-27 (Cal.
2002).
173. Id. at 124-27.
174. Id. at 126.
175. Id. at 128.
176. Id. at 126.
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approved Doe's alternate holdings based on Penal Code sections 57031
and 12026 without any criticism or attempt to limit them. Nor did the
court treat these alternate holdings as dictum. Had the California Su-
preme Court wished to discredit Doe, narrow its scope, or otherwise
criticize the case, it had every opportunity to do so. But it did not.
IV. The Unsafe Handgun Act
In 1999, the California Legislature enacted the Unsafe Handgun
Act 177 ("UHA"). The UHA was precipitated by a growing number of
local Saturday Night Special ordinances (like the one challenged in
the CRPA case), which called to the Legislature's attention the need
to address the issue in a comprehensive and technically competent
manner at the state level. 178
The UHA established a detailed protocol for designating which
handguns may be sold in the state. 179 The UHA charges the California
Department of Justice ("DOJ") with conducting handgun testing, col-
lecting a licensing fee, and issuing a roster of handgun models that,
having passed the tests, "may be sold in this state pursuant to this
titie."180
On its face, the Legislature's choice of this language precludes
any local law barring the sale of handguns so approved by the DOJ.
Thus, a ban on the sale of handguns that appear on the DOJ roster
(such as Proposition H, section 2181) would be invalid, being an enact-
ment whose effect is "penalizing conduct which the state law expressly
authorizes."1 8 2
Nor may it be argued that the UHA is simply a gun safety measure
and so should not be held to preempt local gun bans whose purpose is
to reduce violent crime. The legislative history of the UHA leaves no
doubt that its goals included curbing handgun crime as well as pro-
moting gun safety. That history shows that: (1) in general, banning
cheaply-made guns has long been advocated as a means of reducing
177. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12125-12133 (West Supp. 2006).
178. See, e.g., WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL. MUN. CODE § 4122 (repealed 2000). This ordi-
nance, and those like it, was superseded by the UHA.
179. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12125-12133 (West Supp. 2006).
180. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12131 (a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006). One of the prerequisites
to being listed on the DOJ roster is that the manufacturer must also pay a fee.
181. See infra Appendix A.
182. Bravo Vending v. City of Rancho Mirage, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 164, 170 (Ct. App.
1993).
[Vol. 41
gun availability to criminals;183 (2) the first two times the Legislature
enacted the UHA, it was vetoed by then-Governor Pete Wilson be-
cause it was not simply a gun safety law but also sought to ban sales of
handguns that the Legislature (but not the Governor) saw as specially
prone to criminal misuse; 8 4 and (3) cities and groups supporting the
UHA's enactment wrote the Legislature urging that the UHA be en-
acted as a measure that would reduce crime by banning certain
guns.1 85 The UHA was signed by Governor Wilson's successor, Gover-
nor Gray Davis.' 8 6
It bears emphasis that the Legislature was well aware when the
UHA was being enacted that it would preempt local gun laws. When
the UHA was being drafted, both state and local legislators and offi-
cials realized it would preempt current Saturday Night Special bans
and future attempts at local handgun bans.18 7 The Legislature had
been expressly informed by a city having a Saturday Night Special or-
183. See, e.g., Philip J. Cook, The 'Saturday Night Special': An Assessment of Alternative Deft-
nitionsfrom a Policy Perspective, 72J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1735, 1740 (1981) ("Individu-
als who would not ordinarily be able to afford an expensive gun commit a disproportionate
share of violent crimes. [Increasing handgun prices by imposing a minimum tax on sales]
would be an effective means of reducing availability to precisely those groups that account
for the bulk of the violent crime problem .... The major normative argument against
[this] ... is that it is overt economic discrimination .... [But a] high tax is not the only method
of increasing the minimum price of handguns and subtle approaches may be more acceptable politi-
cally. One method would establish minimum standards stipulating the quality of metal and safety
features of a gun. The effect of this approach would be the same as the minimum tax: to eliminate the
cheapest of the domestically manufactured handguns.... If sufficiently high standards on safety and
metal quality were adopted, the cost to manufacturers of meeting these standards would ensure a high
minimum price.") (emphasis added).
184. See Petitioner's Request for Judicial Notice, Fiscal v. City & County of San Fran-
cisco, No. CPF-05-505960 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 29, 2005) (consisting of documents from
the volume on the UHA prepared by the Legislative Intent Service for the petitioners). Cf
Commodore Home Sys., Inc. v. Super. Ct., 649 P.2d 912, 917 (Cal. 1982) ("undated memo
in Assemblyman Lockyer's files, furnished by the Legislative Intent Service."); Arya Group,
Inc. v. Cher, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 815, 818 n.3 (Ct. App. 2000) ("we have taken judicial notice
of the materials provided by the Legislative Intent Service. (EVID. CODE, §§ 452, subd. (c),
459 ... .")); Gaetani v. Goss-Golden West Sheet Metal Profit Sharing Plan, 101 Cal. Rptr.
2d 432, 438 (Ct. App. 2000) ("We, like the trial court, take judicial notice of these materi-
als, most furnished by a commercial firm, the Legislative Intent Service.").
185. See, e.g., Letter from Mary Leigh Blek on behalf of Orange County Citizens for the
Prevention of Gun Violence to Senator Richard Polanco (Feb. 1, 1999) (on file with au-
thors); Letter from Roxanne L. Miller on behalf of the City of San Jose to Senator John
Vasconcellos (Apr. 1, 1999) (on file with authors); Letter from Pete McHugh on behalf of
the Board of Supervisors of Santa Clara County to Senator John Vasconcellos (May 20,
1999) (on file with authors).
186. See UHA, 1999 Cal. Laws ch. 248, 90 (noting that S.B. 15, otherwise known as the
UHA, was approved by the Governor on August 27, 1999).
187. See, e.g., Rep. of the S. Comm. on Public Safety regarding S.B. 15, 1999 Leg., Reg.
Sess., at 10 (Apr. 6, 1999) (document on file with authors); Letter from Roxanne L. Miller
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dinance that its ordinance, and those of other cities, would be pre-
empted by passage of the UHA.' 88 That city urged the Legislature to
insert language exempting local gun bans from preemption.18 9 Con-
comitantly, the Legislature was further informed by a Senate Commit-
tee Report that the UHA might preempt existing and future local
handgun sales ordinances. 90 In response, the author of the UHA in-
serted a provision to preserve local ordinances against preemption by
the UHA. 19 ' When the UHA was eventually enacted, however, the
Legislature stripped out the offered amendments intended to create
an exception to the preemptive impact of the UHA.19 2 This indicates
the Legislature's knowledge and intent to preclude local interference
with its handgun legislation or laws inimical to the UHA. The Legisla-
ture recognized that the UHA would preempt any "local [contrary]
ordinance, both those already in existence and any proposed locally in
the future."' 93
As already stated, CRPA left cities some leeway to ban sales of a
subset of guns based on that subset being deemed to present dangers
to public safety above and beyond the dangers represented by hand-
guns in general. With the passage of the UHA, however, that option
has been preempted.
Conclusion
The principal obstacle to the enactment of local gun bans in Cali-
fornia is Penal Code section 12026. That statute was enacted in 1923
as part of the UFA's enactment of a scheme of California state laws
drafted and supported by the National Rifle Association. 1 94 The UFA's
dual purposes were described as "both protect[ing] arms ownership and
reduc [ing] crime." 1 95 Concomitantly, the president of the Sacramento
Gun Club, who a contemporary article in the San Francisco Chronicle
on behalf of the City of San Jose to SenatorJohn Vasconcellos (Apr. 1, 1999) (on file with
authors).
188. See Letter from Roxanne L. Miller on behalf of the City of San Jose to Senator
John Vasconcellos (Apr. 1, 1999) (on file with authors).
189. See id.
190. See Rep. of the S. Comm. on Public Safety, supra note 187, at 10.
191. See Proposed Non-Preemption Amendment to S.B. 15, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
1999) (on file with authors).
192. See S.B. 15, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999).
193. Rep. of the S. Comm. on Public Safety, supra note 187, at 9.
194. See LEDDY, supra note 48, at 88.
195. LEDDY, supra note 48, at 87 (emphasis added) (quoting from the description of
the UFA's purposes given in urging its enactment by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws).
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credited with convincing the governor to sign the UFA, described it as
"an effort upon the part of those who know something about firearms
to forestall the flood of fanatical legislation intended to deprive all
citizens of the United States of the right to own and use ... firearms
capable of being concealed upon the person."1 96
Section 12026 prohibits local licensing or permitting of hand-
guns. In Galvan, the California Supreme Court construed section
12026 as depriving localities of the power to "license" handguns in the
sense of "permission or authority to do a particular thing or exercise a
particular privilege."'197 Subsequently, Doe struck down a local hand-
gun ban under section 12026 based on the California Legislature's
intention "to occupy the field of residential handgun possession to the
exclusion of local governmental entities."'198 The Legislature later re-
affirmed that conclusion by thrice reenacting section 12026 without
change to repudiate Doe. Moreover, in the wake of Galvan's definition
of "licensing," the Legislature enacted Government Code section
53071, which prohibits "all local regulations, relating to registration or
licensing of commercially manufactured firearms .... "199
Last, but scarcely least, all the foregoing must be considered in
the context of a long pattern of state legislation carefully preserving
the right of law-abiding responsible adults to use firearms for self-de-
fense and the prevention of crime. For upwards of a century, the ratio-
nale underlying gun prohibitions has consisted of vociferous denial
that gun ownership is a sensible precaution against violent crime. But,
for at least that long, the pattern of California legislation has reflected
the contrary view that guns are part of the solution to crime, that guns
allow good people to defend themselves and their families, and that
they can deter criminal conduct from occurring in the first place. Lo-
cal legislators are entitled to disagree. However, until gun ban advo-
cates convince the Legislature to repeal sections 12026(b) and 53071,
local gun bans will remain contrary to state law and pretermitted
thereby.
196. New Firearms Law Effective on August 7, S.F. CHRON., July 15, 1923, at 3.
197. Galvan v. Super. Ct., 452 P.2d 930, 933 (Cal. 1969).
198. Doe v. City & County of San Francisco, 186 Cal. Rptr. 380, 385 (Ct. App. 1982).
199. Id. at 384 (applying that language in holding that section 53071 preempts a local
handgun possession ban).
Winter 2007]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
Appendix A: Proposition H
ARTICLE 36A. Sale, Manufacture and Distribution of Firearms and
Ammunition; Possession of Handguns
SEC. 3600A. Statement of Findings and Text of Ordinance
Prohibiting the Sale, Manufacture and Distribution of
Firearms and Ammuniction in the City and County of
San Francisco and Limiting the Possession of
Handguns in the City and County of San Francisco
This ordinance is enacted to implement an initiative ordinance ap-
proved by the electors of San Francisco as Proposition "H" at the elec-
tion held on November 8, 2005. The provisions of Proposition "H" are
set forth herein for convenience and may only be amended as pro-
vided by law. Proposition "H" reads as follows:
Section 1. Findings
The people of the City and County of San Francisco hereby find and
declare:
1. Handgun violence is a serious problem in San Francisco. Accord-
ing to a San Francisco Department of Public Health report pub-
lished in 2002, 176 handgun incidents in San Francisco affected
213 victims in 1999, the last year for which data is available. Only
26.8% of firearms were recovered. Of all firearms used to cause
injury or death, 67% were handguns.
2. San Franciscans have a right to live in a safe and secure City. The
presence of handguns poses a significant threat to the safety of San
Franciscans.
3. It is not the intent of the people of the City and County of San
Francisco to affect any resident of other jurisdictions with regard to
handgun possession, including those who may temporarily be
within the boundaries of the City and County.
4. Article XI of the California Constitution provides Charter created
counties with the "home rule" power. This power allows counties to
enact laws that exclusively apply to residents within their borders,
even when such a law conflicts with state law or when state law is
silent. San Francisco adopted its most recent comprehensive Char-
ter revision in 1996.
5. Since it is not the intent of the people of the City and County of
San Francisco to impose an undue burden on inter-county com-
merce and transit, the provisions of Section 3 apply exclusively to
residents of the City and County of San Francisco.
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Section 2. Ban on Sale, Manufacture, Transfer or Distribution of Fire-
arms in the City and County of San Francisco
Within the limits of the City and County of San Francisco, the sale,
distribution, transfer and manufacture of all firearms and ammuni-
tion shall be prohibited.
Section 3. Limiting Handgun Possession in the City and County of San
Francisco
Within the limits of the City and County of San Francisco, no resident
of the City and County of San Francisco shall possess any handgun
unless required for professional purposes, as enumerated herein. Spe-
cifically, any City, state or federal employee carrying out the functions
of his or her government employment, including but not limited to
peace officers as defined by California Penal Code Section 830 et. seq.
and animal control officers may possess a handgun. Active members
of the United States armed forces or the National Guard and security
guards, regularly employed and compensated by a person engaged in
any lawful business, while actually employed and engaged in protect-
ing and preserving property or life within the scope of his or her em-
ployment, may also possess handguns. Within 90 days from the
effective date of this Section, any resident of the City and County of
San Francisco may surrender his or her handgun at any district station
of the San Francisco Police Department, or to the San Francisco Sher-
iffs Department without penalty under this section.
Section 4. Effective Date
This ordinance shall become effective January 1, 2006.
Section 5. Penalties
Within 90 days of the effective date of this Section, the Board of Su-
pervisors shall enact penalties for violations of this ordinance. The
Mayor, after consultation with the District Attorney, Sheriff and Chief
of Police shall, within 30 days from the effective date, provide recom-
mendations about penalties to the Board.
Section 6. State Law
Nothing in this ordinance is designed to duplicate or conflict with
California State Law. Accordingly, any person currently denied the
privilege of possessing a handgun under state law shall not be covered
by this ordinance, but shall be covered by the California state law
which denies that privilege. Nothing in this ordinance shall be con-
strued to create or require any local license or registration for any
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firearm, or create an additional class of citizens who must seek licens-
ing or registration.
Section 7. Severability
If any provision of this ordinance or the application thereof to any
person or circumstances is held invalid or unconstitutional, such inva-
lidity or unconstitutionality shall not affect other provisions or appli-
cations or this ordinance which can be given effect without the invalid
or unconstitutional provision or application. To this end, the provi-
sions of this ordinance shall be deemed severable.
Section 8. Amendment
By a two-thirds vote and upon making findings, the Board of Supervi-
sors may amend this ordinance in the furtherance of reducing hand-
gun violence.
(Added by Ord. 55-06, File No. 060151, App. 3/31/2006)
SEC. 3601A. Penalty for Sale, Distribution, Transfer and
Manufacture of Firearms and Ammunition or Possession of
Handguns Within City and County of San Francisco.
(a) In enacting Proposition "H" the voters required the Board of Su-
pervisors to enact penalties for its violation. The following sections set
forth the penalties for violation of Proposition H.
(b) Any person who shall violate the provisions of Police Code Section
3600A that prohibit the sale, distribution, transfer and manufacture of
all firearms and ammunition within the limits of the City and County
of San Francisco or that prohibit the possession of any handgun
within the limits of the City and County of San Francisco shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished by a
fine not to exceed $1,000 and by imprisonment in the CountyJail not
to exceed six months, or by both.
(c) Any firearm or ammunition sold, distributed, transferred, or man-
ufactured or any handgun possessed within the City and County of
San Francisco in violation of the provisions of Police Code Section
3600A is hereby declared to be a nuisance, and shall be surrendered
to the Police Department of the City and County of San Francisco.
The Chief of Police is authorized to seize such firearms, ammunition
and handguns and shall destroy or cause to be destroyed such fire-
arms, ammunition and handguns, except upon the certificate of a
judge of a court of record, or of the District Attorney that the preser-
vation thereof is necessary or proper to the ends of justice.
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(d) This Section shall be enforced to the full extent of the authority of
the City and County of San Francisco. If any subsection, sentence,
clause, phrase, or word of this Section or the application thereof to
any person or circumstances is held invalid or unconstitutional, such
invalidity or unconstitutionality shall not affect other provisions or ap-
plications of this Section which can be given effect without the invalid
or unconstitutional provision or application. To this end, the provi-
sions of this section shall be deemed severable.
(Added by Ord. 55-06, File No. 060151, App. 3/31/2006).
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